# United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



**APPENDIX** 

# 76-1460

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

DOCKET NO. 76-1460

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,


APPELLEE,

V.

JESUS ORTIZ,

APPELLANT.

APPENDIX TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT JESUS ORTIZ




RICHARD S. CRAMER
ASSISTANT FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER
450 MAIN STREET
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06103
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL COPY

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# PROCEEDINGS (continued)

Document No. 1 TRIAL - Govt. waives to sever case of Enrique Melendez. Motion granted. Govt. moves to allow Thurl Stalnaker, Jr. to appear before Court. Stalnaker is a law student in U.S.Atty's. office. Appearance filed. Motion granted. M. 7-28-76. Govt. mobes that all witnesses be sequestered except for case agent & prosecutors investigator. Mayda Kivchak sworn as interpreter Govt's. Memorandum in Support of the Admissibility of Similar Criminal Acts to Show Intent Knowledge, modus operandi Identity & Lack of Mistake. Jury of 12 reports & are sworn by Clerk. Three Govt. witnesses sworn & testified. Three Govt. exhibits, 1, 2 & 3, filed. Def's. Exh. A, filed. Def's. Exh. B, marked for identification. Argument by both Attorneys on prior similar acts. Decision reserved. Govt. rests at 3:12 p.m. Two def's. witnesses sworn & testified Defense rests at 4:16 p.m. One Govt. witness sworn & testified. Govt. rests at 4:32 p.m. Court adjourned at 4:34 p.m. until tomorrow at 10:00 a.m. (Clarie, J.)
Requests to Charge, filed.

7/28 7/28

JURY TRIAL continues. Atty. Cramer moves to strike all hearmay testimony of events on Feb. 9 & Feb. 10 concerning conspiracy. Motion denied.

Cramer moves for Judgment of Acquittal. Motion denied. Jury of 12 report. Summations from 10:15 a.m. to 11:15 a.m. Court charge from 11:32 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. Jury retires at 12:16 p.m. Atty. Cramer states exceptions to charge & moves for mistrial because of charge on failure of defendant co testify. Motion denied. Indictment & exhibits given to jury at 12:17 p.m. At 1:00 p.m., at jurors request, Court orders lunch for jury. Bill of \$32.45 from Franklin Giant Sandwich Shop. Jury returns to courtroom at 2:48 p.m. with a verdict of guilty on all three counts. Verdict ordered recorded. Atty. Smith argues for increase of bond -Bond \$10,000 with full surety. Court adjourned at

7/30

3:04 p.m. (Clarie, J.)
Court Reporter's notes of Proceedings held on July 7, 1976, filed in Hfd. (sperber, R.)

8/10 9/13

Order for Return of Bond, filed. (Newman, J.) m8/11/76 DISPOSITION - Over to 9/27/76 at 10:00 a.m. (Clarie, J.) DISPOSITION - 7 yrs. impr. on each of cts.

#1, 2 & 3 to be followed by a Special Parole period of 3 yrs. imposed to provisions of 21 USC 841. Said sentences on each of said counts #1,2 & 3 are to be Marie Foden sworn as interserved concurrently. preter. (Clarie, J.)

Judgment and Commitment Order, filed. (Clarie, J. M.9-28-76. Two attested copies handed US Marshal in Hartford and one attested copy handed US Probation Officer in Hartford.

AO-257

9/27

9/27

App. 3

Interval

Start Date

PROCEEDINGS (continued)  9/28 Notice of Appeal, filed. Copies sent to counsel of record.  9/29 Certified copy of Notice of Appeal and Docket Entries mailed to Clerk, USCA  9/29 Curt Reporter's notes of Proceedings held on July 27 & 28, 1976, filed in Hartford. (Sperber, R.)  9/30 Notice of Parts of Transcript Ordered and Proposed	(b)	DELA)
9/28 Notice of Appeal, filed. Copies sent to counsel of record.  9/29 Certified copy of Notice of Appeal and Docket Entries mailed to Clerk, USCA Curt Reporter's notes of Proceedings held on July 27 & 28, 1976, filed in Hartford. (Sperber, R.)		
Issues for Appeal, filed.  9/28  CJA 21 authorizing transceipt, filed.(Clarie, J.)		
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App. 4 Interval		

#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

#### DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CRIMINAL NO. H76-29

ENRIQUE MELENDEZ, a/k/a "Kiki", and JESUS ORTIZ, a/k/a "Chombo"

INDICTMENT

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:

COUNT I

On or about the 10th day of February, 1376 at Hartford, in the District of Connecticut, the defendants ENRIQUE MELENDEZ and JESUS ORTIZ did unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly combine, conspire, confederate and agree with each other, and with others to the Grand Jury unknown, to commit offenses against the United States, to wit: to violate Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1), by knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance, to wit: a quantity of cocaine, and to knowingly and intentionally distributing the aforesaid controlled substance, i.e., said quantity of cocaine; all in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 846.

# OVERT ACTS

In furtherance of the aforesaid conspiracy, and to effect the objects thereof, the defendants and co-conspirators did perform the following overt acts:

- 1. On February 10, 1976 ENRIQUE MELENDEZ and JESUS ORTIZ had a conversation
- On February 10, 1976 JESUS ORTIZ handed a package to ENRIQUE MELENDEZ.

### COUNT TWO

On February 10, 1976 at Hartford, in the District of Connecticut, ENRIQUE MELENDEZ and JESUS ORTIZ, the defendants herein, knowingly and intentionally did possess with intent to distribute a quantity of cocaine (a Schedule II Controlled Substance), in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).

# COUNT THREE

On February 10, 1976 at Hartford in the District of Connecticut, ENRIQUE MELENDEZ and JESUS ORTIZ, the defendants herein, knowingly and intentionally did distribute a quantity of cocaine (a Schedule II Controlled Substance), in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).

A TRUE BILL.

Q.M. anite

PETER C. DORSEY United States Attorney

THOMAS P. SMITH

Assistant U. S. Attorney

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FILED UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUL 1 2 1976

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

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UNITED S ATES OF AMERICA

v.

CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT CRIMINAL NO. H-76 HARLEGRO, COHN.

PUBLIC DEFENDER

ESUS ORTIZ

MOTION OF DEFENDANT ORTH TO PROHIBIT USE OF PRIOR CONVICTION FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES

The defendant, JESUS ORTIZ, through his attorney hereby requests an order that the Government not use his 1972 conviction for sale of heroin for impeachment purposes if defendant should testify in his own behalf in the above-captioned case.

The defendant maintains that because of the similarity of the 1972 offense to the charges now before the Court, evidence of the prior conviction would be far more prejudicial than it would be probative. Exclusion is sought pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1) and Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Were it not for the prior conviction, defendant would testify in his own behalf.

Dated at Hartford, Connecticut, this 1 day of July, 1976.

> THE DEFENDANT JESUS ORTIZ

Assistant Federal Public Defender

450 Main Street Hartford CT 06103 (203 - 244 - 3357)

App. 7

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing motion was mailed, postage prepaid, this 9th day of July, 1976, to:

Thomas P. Smith, Esq.
Assistant United States Attorney
450 Main Street
Hartford CT 06103

F. Mac Buckley, Esq. Buckley & Santos 51 Russ Street Hartford CT 06106

Richard S. Cramer

Assistant Federal Public Defender

PPI -89 -2-3-75 50M -887

Interpreter, so that it will make it easier for her to follow?

Call the jury.

(In the presence of the jury:)

THE COURT: The Court has given the Interpreter a copy of the Court's charge. And if I should read too fast, just raise your hand, and I shall try to slow up enough to make it easier for you.

THE INTERPRETER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Now that you have heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the time has come to instruct you as to the law governing this case.

Although you as jurors are the sole judges of the facts, you are duty bound to follow the law as stated in the instructions of the Court, and to apply the law so given to the facts as you find them, from the evidence which is before you.

You are not to single out one instruction of the Court alone as stating the law, but you must consider the instructions as a whole. Neither are you to be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of law. Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be, it would be a

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violation of your sworn duty to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that given in the instructions of the Court.

Now, the indictment, the document which I hold here, the original of which you shall have with you in the jury room, is but a formal method of accusing the defendant of a crime. It is not evidence of any crime against the accused in this case, and does not create any presumption, nor permit any inference of guilt.

The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of crime. Thus, at the moment a defendant begins the trial, he stands before you free from any bias or prejudice or burden arising from his position as the accused. So far as you are concerned, he then was innocent, and he continues innocent throughout the trial and during the deliberations of the jury, and is overcome when and only when his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt.

This presumption also requires that if a piece of evidence is offered which is capable of two reasonable constructions, one of which is consistent with innocence, it must be given that construction.

Whether the burden of proof resting upon the Government is sustained depends not on the number of witnesses, or the quantity of the testimony, but upon the nature and the quality of the testimony.

In order to convict one accused of crime
the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt. A mere
preponderance of the evidence is not sufficient.

And if a reasonable doubt does exist in the minds of the jury, they must acquit the defendant. If the evidence justifies in you. judgment the conclusion that the accused is guilty, so as to exclude every other reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, then of course you will find him guilty.

The term "reasonable doubt" means just what the term implies. By "reasonable doubt" I do not mean to be understood as stating that the defendant must be found guilty beyond all doubt whatsoever, but beyond a doubt founded in reason, and arising from the evidence. Reasonable doubt is a doubt arising from the evidence or from a lack of evidence, after a consideration of all the evidence.

It is not a vague, speculative, imaginary something, but just such doubt as would cause reasonable men and women to hesitate to act upon it in matters of importance to themselves.

Reasonable doubt means such doubt as will leave the juror's mind, after a candid and impartial consideration of all the evidence, so undecided that he or she is unable to say that he or she has an abiding conviction or assurance of the defendant's guilt.

The law does not require a person to be proven guilty beyond a mathematical certainty, but only a moral certainty.

If after you have considered and weighed all the evidence in this case, in the light of the law as the Court will have given it to you, you have a firm, full and abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, that the defendant is guilty as charged in the indictment, then this guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.

If you do not have a full, firm and abiding conviction, then guilt has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt, and then you should then acquit the defendant.

In order to convict one accused of crime,

all of the elements of the crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, unless the jury concludes that all the material elements of said crime, as alleged, have been committed by the defendant, and said elements have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury must bring in a verdict of not guilty.

Now, in the remainder of what I have to say to you in this jury charge, I shall use the word "prove" or "proved" with reference to the burden which rests upon the Government. And I shall speak to you of your finding various facts or elements in the case.

But, throughout you will understand that when I say the Government has to prove a fact to you, I mean it has to prove it to you, that fact, with this degree of proof that I've just defined: that is, beyond a reasonable doubt, even though I may not repeat those exact words.

When I say you must find a fact, I mean you must find it proven beyond a reasonable doubt, even though I simply use the word "find".

Now, there are two types of evidence from which a jury may properly find a defendant guilty of an offense. One is direct evidence, such as

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the testimony of an eye witness. The other is circumstantial evidence, the proof of a chain of circumstances pointing to the commission of the offense.

As a general rule the law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, but simply requires that before convicting a defendant the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from all of the evidence in the case.

An inference is a deduction or conclusion which reason and common sense leads the jury to draw from facts which have been proved. In arriving at your decision, you, the jury, may draw inferences from those facts which are admitted or those facts which you find to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, no inference is reliable which is drawn from facts which are themselves uncertain. You, the jury, should not indulge in speculation or conjecture.

Now, a presumption is a conclusion which the law requires the jury to make from particular facts, in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary. A presumption continues in effect

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until overcome or outweighed by the evidence to the contrary. But, unless so outweighed, the jury are bound to find in accordance with the presumption.

This defendant is presumed innocent unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the offenses with which he is charged.

Now, you il notice on the indictment, which you will have "ith you in the jury room, the name of one other person appears thereon as a defendant; namely, Enrique Melendez, also known as Kiki. For the purposes of this trial you will concern yourselves only with the charges against the defendant, Jesus Ortiz. I think I will follow the pronounciation used by the prosecutor, and the defense counsel; I understand in Spanish that the "J" is pronounced as an "H". So counsel has been using, probably, the correct pronounciation, Jesus Ortiz. And I will use that thereafter. Jesus Octiz, also known as "Chombo". And that has been testified to as being a nickname for Jesus Ortiz. He is the only person being tried at this time.

The indictment against the defendant, Ortiz, contains three separate counts. Each count is a

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separate and distinct cause of action, and each count embodies or contains allegations which allege a separate and distinct claim under the statute.

The mere fact that you may find the defendant guilty on one count does not necessarily affect his guilt or innocence on any other count.

Now, the first count of the indictment charges: "On or about the 10th day of February, 1976, at Hartford, in the District of Connecticut, the defendants, Enrique Melendez and Jesus Ortiz, did unlawfully, willfully and knowingly combine, conspire, confederate and agree with each other, and with others to the grand jury unknown, to commit offenses against the United States, to wit: to violate Title 21, U.S. Code, Section 841(a)(1), by knowingly and intentionally possessing, with intent to distribute, a controlled substance, to wit: a quantity of cocaine. And to knowingly and intentionally distribute the aforesaid controlled substance, said quantity of cocaine, all in violation of Title 21, U.S. Code, Section 846.

"In furtherance of the aforesaid conspiracy, and to effect the objects thereof, the defendants

and co-conspirators did perform the following overt acts: On February 10, 1976, Enrique Melendez and Jesus Ortiz had a conversation; and second, on February 10, 1976, Jesus Ortiz handed a package to Enrique Melendez."

Those are the overt acts. The statue with which the defendant Ortiz is charged in this first count is known as the conspiracy statute, and it provides, and I quote: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in the Drug Control Act, is punishable by imprisonment or fine, or both, which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."

The substantive offenses with which the defendant is charged are set out in the second and third counts, under Title 21, Section 841, and they relate to the violation of federal statutes dealing with possession with intent to distribute or dispense cocaine, and the distribution and dispensing of cocaine, a controlled substance. These are the acts or offenses which the first count charges the defendants conspired to commit.

Now in order to establish the offense of conspiracy charged in the first count of the indictment, the evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt the following four elements:

First, that the conspiracy described in the indictment was formed and existing at or about the time alleged;

Second, that the accused willfully became a member of the conspiracy;

Third, that one of the alleged conspirators named in the indictment thereafter committed at least one of the overt acts charged in the indictment at or about the time and place alleged; and

Fourth, that such overt act or acts were committed in furtherance of some object or purpose of the conspiracy as charged.

Now, if the jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in the case that the existence of the conspiracy charged in the indictment has been proved, then proof of the conspiracy offense as charged is complete.

And it is complete as to every person found by the jury to have been willfully a member of the conspiracy at the time.

committed by a defendant in an effort to effect or accomplish some object or purpose of the conspiracy. The overt act need not be in itself criminal in nature, if considered separately and apart from the conspiracy. It may be as innocent as the act of a man walking across the street, or driving an automobile, or using a telephone, or nodding his head.

It must, however, be an act which follows and tends toward the accomplishment of the plan or scheme agreed upon, and must be knowingly done in furtherance of some object or purpose of the conspiracy, as charged in the indictment.

If you find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the existence of the conspiracy charged in the indictment has been proven, and that during the existence of that conspiracy at least one of the overt acts alleged was knowingly done by the defendants, or one of them, in furtherance of some object or purpose of the conspiracy as charged, then proof of the conspiracy as charged becomes complete.

And it is complete as to these defendants, if you find they had been knowingly and willfully a member

of the conspiracy at the time the overt act was committed.

Now, what is a conspiracy? Simply, a conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish some unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some lawful purpose by unlawful means.

So a conspiracy is a kind of partnership in criminal purposes, in which each member becomes the agent of every other member. The gist of the offense is a combination or agreement to disobey or to disregard the law.

Mere similarity of conduct among various persons, and the fact that they may have been associated with each other, may have assembled together and discussed common aims and interests, does not necessarily establish proof of the existence of a conspiracy.

However, the evidence in the case need not show that the members entered into any expressed or formal agreement, or that they directly, by words spoken, or in writing, stated between themselves what their object or purpose was to be, or the details thereof, or the means by which the object or purpose was to be accomplished.

What the evidence in the case must show beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to establish the proof that a conspiracy existed, is that the members in some way or manner, or through some contrivance, positively or tacitly came to a mutual understanding, to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan.

The evidence in the case need not establish that all the means or methods set forth in the indictment were agreed upon to carry out the alleged conspiracy, nor that all means or methods which were agreed upon were actually used or put into operation; nor that all of the persons charged to have been members of the alleged conspiracy were such.

what the evidence in the case must establish beyond a reasonable doubt is that the alleged conspiracy was knowingly formed, and that one or more of the means or methods described in the indictment were agreed upon to be used in an effort to effect or accomplish some object or purpose of the conspiracy as charged in the indictment. And that two or more persons, including one or more of the accused -- in this case the accused -- was knowingly a member of the

conspiracy, as charged in the indictment.

One may become a member of the conspiracy without full knowledge or all the details of the conspiracy. On the other hand, a person who has no knowledge of the conspiracy, but happens to act in a way which furthers some object or purpose of the conspiracy, does not thereby become a member, or become a conspirator.

I will read that over more carefully -- I hesitated in the middle of the paragraph, and made it not too clear.

One may become a member of a conspiracy without full knowledge of all the details of the conspiracy. On the other hand, a person who has no knowledge of the conspiracy but happens to act in a way which furthers some object or purpose of the conspiracy does not thereby become a conspirator.

Defore the jury may find that a defendant or any other person has become a member of a conspiracy, the evidence in the case must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy was knowingly formed, and that the defendant or other person who is claimed to have been a member willfully participated in the unlawful plan with

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the intent to advance or further some object or purpose of the conspiracy.

act or participate willfully means to act or participate voluntarily and intentionally, and with specific intent to do something which the law forbids, or with specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done.

That is to say, to act or participate with a bad purpose, either to disobey or to disregard the law. So, if a defendant or any other person, with understanding of the unlawful character of a plan, knowingly encourages, advises, or assists, for the purpose of furthering the undertaking or scheme, he thereby becomes a willful participant: a conspirator.

One who willfully joins an existing conspir by is charged with the same responsibility as if he had been one of the originators or instigators of the conspiracy.

In determining whether a conspiracy existed, the jury should consider the actions and declarations of all of the alleged participants. However, in determining whether a particular defendant was a member of the conspiracy, if any, the jury should consider only his acts and

statements. He cannot be bound by the acts or declarations of other participants until 10 is established that a conspiracy existed, and that he was one of its members.

doubt from the evidence in the case that a conspiracy existed, and that the defendant was one of the members, then the statements thereafter knowingly made, and the acts thereafter knowingly done by any person likewise found to be a member, may be considered by the jury as evidence in the case as to the defendant found to have been a member; even though the statements and acts may have occurred in the absence and without the knowledge of the defendant, provided such statements and acts were knowingly made and done during the continuance of such conspiracy, and in furtherance of some object or purpose of the conspiracy.

Otherwise, any admission or incriminatory statement made, or act done outside of court by one person may not be considered as evidence against any person who was not present and did not hear the statement made, or see the act done.

Therefore, statements of any conspirator,

which are not in furtherance of the conspiracy, or made before its existence, or after its termination, may be considered as evidence only against the person making them.

In your consideration of the evidence in the case as to the offense of conspiracy charged, you should first determine whether or not the conspiracy existed, as alleged in the indictment. And if you conclude that the conspiracy did exist, you should next determine whether or not the accused willfully became a member of the conspiracy.

If it appears beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in the case that the conspiracy alleged in the indictment was willfully formed and that a defendant willfully became a member of the conspiracy, either at its inception or afterwards, then there may be a conviction, even though the conspirators may not have succeeded in accomplishing their common object or purpose, and in fact may have failed in so doing.

The extent of any defendant's participation, moreover, is not determinative of his guilt or innocence. A defendant may be convicted as a conspirator even though he may have played only a

minor part in the conspiracy.

So, in the first count against the two named defendants, one of whom is on trial, Ortiz, the indictment charges a conspiracy between Melendez and Ortiz, and other persons unknown to the grand jury.

A person cannot conspire with himself alone, and thereafter you cannot find a defendant guilty unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that he participated in the conspiracy as charged with at least one other person, whether such person is a defendant or not, and whether named in the indictment or not.

In other words, the nature of a conspiracy is a combination that requires at least two participants, as alleged and set forth in the complaint or indictment, the accusation.

The second count against the defendant charges that: "On February 10, 1976, at Hartford, the same two, Melendez and Ortiz, knowingly and intentionally did possess, with intent to distribute, a quantity of cocaine, in violation of the law.

That portion of the statute which this count applies to reads in part:

"Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to distribute or dispense or possess, with intent to distribute, or dispense a controlled substance."

Now, cocaine is a crystalline alkaloid which is derived and obtained from cocoa leaves.

Title 21, Section 812 of the United States Code lists cocaine as a controlled substance or drug.

There are four essential elements required to be proven by the Government in order to establish the offense charged in the second sount.

First, that the substance involved was, in fact, cocaine;

Second, that the defendant did, in fact, have knowing possession of cocaine;

Third, that his possession was had with intent to distribute or dispense said cocaine; and that

Fourth, that his act or acts were knowingly and intentionally carried out.

With respect to the first element, I have defined the term "cocaine" as a matter of law.

I instruct you that cocaine is included within Section II of Title 21, Section 812. Therefore,

if you find that cocaine was involved, then you will find that the first element has been proven by the Government.

You have heard the testimony of the Government chemist, who testified here, relative to the nature of the substance as he found it.

With respect to the second element, the law recognizes two kinds of possession: actual possession and constructive possession. A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a given time is then in actual possession of it.

A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention, at a given time, to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly, or through another person or persons, is then in constructive possession of it.

The law recognizes also that possession may be sole or joint. If one person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole. If two or more persons share actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is joint.

You may find that the element of possession,

as that term is used in these instructions, is

presel if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant had actual or constructive

possession, either alone or jointly with others.

In order to prove the third element, the Government must prove that the defendant possessed said controlled drug with intent to distribute or dispense the same.

Intent ordinarily may not be proved directly, because there is no way of fathoming or scrutinizing the operations of the human mind.

You may infer a defendant's intent from the surrounding circumstances. And you may consider any statement made and done or omitted by the defendant, and all other facts and circumstances in evidence which indicate his state of mind. It is ordinarily reasonable to infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted.

You may, but you are not obligated, to draw an inference from the amount of the caine seized, if you should find that the defendants, or either of them, had knowing possession of it, and that it was intended to be distributed or dispensed for sale.

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With respect to the fourth element, the Government must prove that the defendant's act or acts were knowingly and intentionally carried out.

To do something knowingly is to do it voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.

The purpose of adding the word "knowingly" is to insure that no one would be convicted for an act done because of mistake or accident, or other innocent reason.

It is for you, the jury, to determine whether or not all four of the elements of the crime charged in the second count have been proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt. On your findings shall be determined the guilt or innocence of the defendant, Ortiz, on this count.

The third count, the final count of the indictment, charges, and I quote:

"On February 10, 1976, at Hartford, in the District of Connecticut, Enrique Melendez and Jesus Ortiz, the defendants herein, knowingly and intentionally did distribute a quantity of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of Title 21, United States Code,

Section 841(a)(1)."

The same statute that I read to you as being applicable to the second count is applicable to this count.

The elements required to be proved by the Government in this count are:

First, that the substance involved in the sale or transaction was, in fact, cocaine;

Second, that the defendant did, in fact, distribute said cocaine; and

Third, that the defendant's act or acts were knowingly and intentionally carried out.

The same proof required in the first and fourth elements of the second count are required with respect to the first and third elements of this, the third count.

In order to prove the second element, the Government must prove not only that the defendant possessed said controlled drug with intent to distribute or dispense the same, but that he did, in fact, dispense and distribute said cocaine, as alleged.

As I previously pointed out, intent ordinarily may not be proven directly, because there is no way of fathoming or scrutinizing the

infer a defendant's intent from the surrounding circumstances. You may consider any statements made and done or omitted a defendant, and all other facts and circumstances in evidence which indicate his state of mind. It is ordinarily reasonable to infer that a person intends the natural consequences of facts knowingly done, and knowingly omitted.

With respect to this second element, the Government must prove that the defendant did actually distribute and dispense said controlled drug.

In other words, the Government's proof concerned is not directed at simple possession of the controlled drug; rather, it alleges that the defendant did actually distribute and dispense or sell a controlled drug, namely, cocaine.

Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Government to prove that the defendant did, in fact, distribute or dispense and sell the cocaine.

In the indictment it is alleged that a particular amount or quantity of cocaine was involved. The evidence in the case need not

establish that the amount or quantity of cocaine was as alleged in the indictment, but only that some measurable amount of cocaine was in fact the subject of the acts charged in the indictment.

You will, of course, first ascertain whether or not the substance in question is in fact cocaine, as alleged. And in so doing you will consider all evidence in the case which may aid determination of that issue, including the testimony of any expert or chemist, or other witness who may have testified either to support or to dispute the allegation that the substance in question is cocaine, as charged.

Now, credibility of witnesses.

You, as jurors, are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight their testimony deserves.

You should carefully scrutinize the testimony given, the circumstances under which each witness has testified, and every matter in evidence which tends to indicate whether the witness is worthy of belief.

Consider each witness' intelligence,
motive and state of mind, and demeanor and manner
while on the witness stand. Consider also any

relation which each witness may bear to either side of the case; the manner in which each witness might be affected by the verdict, and the extent to which, if at all, each witness is either supported or contradicted by other evidence.

Inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of a witness, or between the testimony of different witnesses, may or may not cause the jury to discredit such testimony. Two or more persons witnessing an incident or a transaction may see or hear it differently; an innocent misrecollection, like failure of recollection, is not an uncommon experience.

In weighing the effect of a discrepancy, consider whether it pertains to a matter of importance, or an unimportant detail; whether the discrepancy results from innocent error or from willful falsehood.

All evidence of a witness whose self-interest or attitude is shown to be such as might tend to prompt testimony unfavorable to the accused, should be considered with caution and weighed with great weight.

A witness may be discredited or impeached by contradictory evidence, or by evidence that at

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other times the witness has made state ents which are inconsistent with the witness' present testimony.

If you believe any witness has been impeached, and thus discredited, it is your exclusive province to give the testimony of that witness such credibility, if any, as you may think it deserves.

If a witness is shown knowingly to have testified falsely concerning any material matter, you have a right to distrust such witness' testimony in other particulars. And you may reject all the testimony of that witness, or give it such credibility as you may think it deserves.

There was testimony here from law enforcement officers in this case. Officer Valentin. The testimony of a law enforcement officer is entitled to no special or exclusive sanctity, merely because it comes from a law enforcement officer.

A law enforcement officer who takes the witness stand subjects his testimony to the same examination and the same tests as any other witness does. And in the case of such officer you

should not believe him merely because he's a law enforcement officer. You should evaluate his testimony as you do that of any other witness.

The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit witnesses to testify as to opinions or conclusions. An exception to this rule exists as to those whom we call expert witnesses.

Witnesses who, by education and experience, have become expert in some art, science, profession, or calling, may state an opinion as to relevant and material matters in which they profess to be experts, and may also state their reasons for their opinions.

The witness, Jack Fasanello, the chemist, who testified in this case, would be a so-called expert witness.

You should consider his opinion and give it such weight as you may think it deserves. If you should decide that his opinion is not based upon sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support of his opinion are not sound, or that his opinion is outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard the opinion entirely.

You have heard the testimony of

Mr. Luis P. Lopez, the Government informant. The testimony of an informant who provides evidence against a defendant for pay, must be examined and weighed by the jury with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness.

The jury must determine whether the informant's testimony has been affected by self-interest, or by prejudice against the defendant, or for monetary or other gains or benefits.

In considering the testimony of the witness,

Lopez, you recall there was testimony about his

prior criminal record. I call your attention

to the fact that the testimony of a witness may

be discredited or impeached by showing that the

witness has been convicted of a felony; that is,

a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term

of one year or more.

Prior conviction does not render a witness incompetent to testify, but it is merely a circumstance which you may consider in determining the credibility of that witness. It is solely within the province of the jury to determine the weight to be given any prior conviction as impeachment of his credibility.

The law does not compel a defendant in a criminal case to take the witness star I and testify. And no presumption of guilt may be raised, and no inference of any kind may be drawn, from the failure of the defendant, Jesus Ortiz, to testify.

As stated before, the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses, or producing any evidence

The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. In order to return a verdict it is necessary that each juror agree thereto. In other words, your verdict must be unanimous.

It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another, and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors.

In the course of your deliberations do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But,

do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.

Upon retiring to the jury room you will select one of your number as a foreman, or a forelady, or a foreperson. And the foreman will preside over your deliberations, as a chairman, or chairperson would in the deliberations of a committee.

After you have selected such a foreman or chairperson, you will refrain from considering the case until the Clerk brings in to you the copy -- the original indictment, and the exhibits which have been admitted here in evidence.

And the reason for that is because after you have retired either counsel may ask the Court to state something more fully, more clearly, or even correct some of the portions of the charge related to this particular offense.

If the Court is of the opinion that any such observation is proper, the Court might recall you within a few moments, and give you such corrections, or elucidate further upon

certain aspects that either counsel may request.

However, when the Clerk brings in to you these exhibits, and the indictment, you may then proceed to conclusion with your deliberations.

Now, it is approximately 12:15, and we will proceed with your deliberations until one o'clock, at which time I will ask the Bailiff or Marshal and the Clerk -- so that there will be two people in there at all times -- to go and take your order for lunch -- unless you conclude your duties before that time.

But, if not, at one o'clock we will ask
the Marshal and the Clerk to go in and take your
orders for lunch, and it will be brought back to
you in the jury room.

And while the Marshal or the Bailiff and the Clerk are in the jury room at one o'clock to take your order, or when they are delivering your order, do not discuss the case whatsoever, or make any comment to them, other than pertaining to your luncheon order.

The jury may now retire.

(In the absence of the jury:)

THE COURT: Does the Government have any exceptions to note for the record?

MR. SMITH: None, your Honor. THE COURT: Counsel for the defendant have 2 3 any exceptions to note for the record? 4 MR. CRAMER: Yes, I do, your Honor. I didn't ask for an instruction concerning 5 the lack of defendant's testimony, or testifying 6 7 in this case, and I think it is prejudicial. 8 I think it points up the failure to testify. 9 I move for a mistrial at this point, because I didn't know it was going to be given. 10 11 I move for a mistrial. 12 THE COURT: Denied. 13 Anything else? 14 MR. CRAMER: I have nothing else, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Will counsel view the form of the indictment and the exhibits which are before 16 the Court, to see if they are in order to be sent 17 18 into the jury room? 19 MR. SMITH: Fine with the Government, your 20 Honor. 21 MR. CRAMER: Okay, your Honor, fine. 22 THE COURT: Before we send them in I want 23 to ask the interpreter -- on one page I noted 24 I used the term "cocaine". It is printed here "heroin". My stenographer 25

didn't correct it. 2 Did you use the word "cocaine"? 3 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, your Honor, I did. THE COURT: Very well. (Pause.) THE CLERK: The jurors have the indictment and the exhibits, your Honor. 8 THE COURT: The Court will stand in recess. (Court was in recess until 2:00 p.m., when 10 the jury returned with their verdict.) 11 (In the presence of the jury:) 12 THE CLERK: Will the defendant please rise? 13 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, have you 14 agreed upon a verdict? 15 THE FOREMAN: We have, your Honor. 16 THE CLERK: Will the foreman please identify 17 himself by name, for the record? 18 THE FOREMAN: Tom Walasewicz. 19 THE CLERK: What is your verdict on Count 1? 20 THE FOREMAN: Guilty. 21 THE CLERK: What is your verdict on Count 2? 22 THE FOREMAN: Guilty. 23 THE CLERK: What is your verdict on Count 3? 24 THE FORFMAN: Guilty. 25 THE CLERK: Ladies and gentlemen, kindly

## JULY 27, 1976:

(In the presence of the jury:)

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RAFAEL VALENTIN, appearing as

a witness, being duly sworn, testified as follows:

THE CLERK: Would you state your full name?

THE WITNESS: Rafael Valentin.

THE CLERK: Your address, Mr. Valentin?

THE WITNESS: 294 Colony Street, Meriden.

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SMITH:

Q Mr. Valentin, are you employed?

Yes, I am.

Q Would you tell the members of the jury what you do for a living?

A I am employed by the Connecticut State Police Department.

- Q How long have you been a Connecticut State Trooper?
- A Fight and a half years.
- Q Are you a uniformed State Trooper?
- Not at the present time, no. 19
- Q At the present time do you work in any particular 20

type of case? 21

- Narcotics investigations. A
- How long have you worked on narcotics cases? Q 23
- A Fight and a half years. 24
- 25 I'm sorry; I didn't hear you. Q

How long have you known Mr. Lopez? Eight or nine months. 2 A Have you ever had occasion to work with Mr. Lopez? 3 2 4 A Yes, I have. 5 Tell the members of the jury about how many times you have worked with Mr. Lopez? 6 7 A 20, 25 times. Q And can you estimate the number of days that you 8 9 have worked with him? A I would say since October, three to four days a 10 week. 11 Q As a result of your work with Mr. Lopez have you 12 made or developed any narcotics cases? 13 A Yes, I have. 14 Q Is Mr. Lopez a police officer? 15 A No, he's not. 16 Tell the members of the jury just exactly what 17 Mr. Luis Lopez does? 18 A Luis Topez furnished us the information regarding 19 narcotics investigations. 20 Is it fair to say he is a confidential informant? Q 21 A Definitely, yes. 22 Q What exactly is the function of a confidential 23 informant, particularly Luis Lopez?

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A Well, to furnish information regarding narcotics

Does Enrique Melendez, to your knowledge, have a nickname? Yes, he does. 3 A What is that nickname, if you know? 4 Kiki. 5 Kiki Welendez? 6 Yes. Have you ever met Kiki Melendez before? 8 I have met him, yes. Is Kiki his real name? 10 No. that's a nickname. 11 Do you know where Kiki Melendez lives? Q 12 A Yes, I do. 13 Q Where does he live? 14 A 15 Cabot Street. 15 Whereabouts is that? 16 In Hartford. A 17 Do you know what relationship, if any, Kiki 18 Melendez is to Jesus Ortiz? 19 I believe his brother-in-law. 20 His brother-in-law? Do you know whether Kiki 21 Melendez himself has an older brother? 22 23 Yes, he does. 24 What is the name of that older brother? Q 25 A Frankie.

1	Q	Frankie Melendez?
2	Α ·	Yes.
3	Q	And what is Frankie's real name, if you know?
4	A	I don't remember.
5	2	Now, do you know where Frankie Melendez lives?
6	1 13 122	No, I don't. I was told that he was staying at
7 8	a hotel.	Do you know where he hangs out, any particular
9	spot?	OMFELT
10	A	Spanish Bar.
11	Q	Any other particular spot?
12	- A	15 Catot Street.
13	Q	15 Cabot Street? Do you know where Mr. Ortiz
14	lives?	
15	A	Yes, I do.
16	ą	Where does he live?
17	A	15 Cabot Street.
18	Q	The same building with Mr. Kiki Melendez?
19	A	Yes.
20	Q	Now, directing your attention to February 9th,
21	1976, d1d	you have occasion to see Kiki Melendez on that
22	date?	
23	A	Yes, I did.
24	Q	Would you tell the members of the jury who, if
25	anyone els	se, was with you when you saw Kiki Melendez?

II		
1	Α	Luis Lopez.
2	Q	Mr. Lopez?
3	A	Yes.
4	Q	And where did you first see Kiki Melendez on
5	February (	Oth, 1976?
6	А	I saw him in the hallway of the second floor
7	hallway of	15 Cabot Street.
8	Q	Now, can you describe for the members of the jury
9	the type	of building that 15 Cabot Street is?
10	A	It is a multi-family brick building.
11	Q	An apartment house?
12	A	Apartment house.
13	Q	And can you estimate how many families live in it?
14	A	About six.
15	Q	Whereabouts in this building did you and Mr. Lopez
16	meet Kiki	Melendez on February 9th, 1976?
17	A	In the hallway of the second floor hallway.
18	Q	And what was your purpose in going to 15 Cabot
19	Street?	
20	A	To purchase narcotics.
21	Q	To purchase narcotics? What kind of narcotics?
22	A	Cocaine.
23	Q	To purchase narcotics from any particular person?
24	A	Yes, from Frankie Melendez.
25	Q	From Frankie Melendez, the older brother of Kiki?

1	11	10
1	A Yes.	
2	Q And the brother-in-law of Mr. Ortiz?	
3	A Yes, sir.	
4	Q Now on February 9th, 1976 did you engage in	any
5	kind of conversation with Kiki Melendez?	
6	A Yes, we asked where Frankie when we went	there
7	the door was open to the apartment. We asked	
8	THE COURT: You say "we went there"; who	0
9	constituted "we"?	
10	THE WITNESS: Mr. Luis Lopez and mysel:	f,
11	your Honor.	
12	And the door was open there with two fer	males
13	there, inside the apartment. We asked where	
14	Frankie was, and they	
15	MR. CRAMER: Objection, your Honor. It	t calls
16	for a hearsay answer.	
17	THE COURT: What they responded is object	ction-
18	able. As a result of that conversation, what	t did
19	you do?	
20	THE WITNESS: We started to leave the an	rea.
21	BY MR. SMITH:	
22	Q Did you see Frankie Malendez?	
23	A He came out and asked who is asking for Frank	cie.
24	Q For Frankie?	
25	A Kiki, I mean.	

1	Q 1	Kiki came out and said who is asking
2		MR. CRAMER: Objection. I move to strike
3	1	that answer on the same grounds.
4		MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I respectfully
5		submit that the Court ought to permit it. It falls
6	(	clearly within the co-conspirator rule.
7		MR. CRAMER: I would like to argue it.
8		THE COURT: Well, it isn't clear to me yet
9	1	who he spoke to. Whether it was Frankie, or
10	,	whether it was Kiki.
11		Let's establish that first.
12		THE WITNESS: We spoke with Kiki.
13		THE COURT: And he is one of the defendants
14	1	here in the conspiracy charge, the first count?
15		MR. SMITH: That's correct.
16		MR. CRAMER: That's correct.
17		THE COURT: As it relates to the first count,
18	(	do you have objection?
19		MR. CRAMER: Yes, I do, your Honor.
20		THE COURT: What is the objection?
21		MR. CRAMER: Could I approach the Bench and
22		make the objection?
23		THE COURT: Yes.
24		(The following transpired at the Bench:)
25		MR. CRAMER: The objection, of course, is that

the answer would be hearsay. If it comes within the co-conspirator exception to the rule, then I have a number of more specific objections.

answer, the exception to the hearsay rule, you first have to establish conspiracy. Secondly, the conspiracy in the indictment talks about a conspiracy on February 10th. We are talking about a statement made on February 9th. In other words, before the existence of the conspiracy.

I know it is "on or about", but as I understand it from the Government's investigation file, the conspiracy didn't arise until February 10th.

I don't know what Mr. Smith's representations are, but I understood all along that a conspiracy started and terminated on February 10, 1976. So, even if there were independent evidence of a conspiracy, this wouldn't be made during the course of and during the furtherance of the conspiracy.

In other words, it wasn't made during the course -- wasn't made during the conspiracy, and wasn't made in furtherance of the conspiracy. And there is no independent evidence of the conspiracy.

Furthermore, I make an objection on the Sixth Amendment, the right to confront this 2 witness. And I think that is an open question as 3 to the Dutton case. He's going to testify 4 concerning very material statements. 5 THE COURT: Who is? 6 MR. CRAMER: Mr. Valentin. And the 7 statements made by Kiki Malendez -- and I don't 8 have the opportunity to cross examine him. THE COURT: You can subpoena him. 10 MR. CRAMER: He'll take the Fifth Amendment. 11 THE COURT: That's something we don't know 12 until he arrives here. 13 You represent that you will establish a 14 conspiracy between Melendez and Ortiz? 15 MR. SMITH: I most certainly do, your Honor. 16 THE COUNT: Objection overruled, as to the 17 first count. 18 MR. CRAMER: Would your Honor make a cautionary 19 instruction that if the Government fails to present 20 independent evidence of a conspiracy, that the 21 statements --22 THE COURT: It will be subject to a motion to 23 strike.

MR. CRAMER: I think the Second Circuit said

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that there should be a cautionary instruction at this point to the jury, so that it fully understands why the hearsay is coming in, and the condition of it.

THE COURT: I will try and state it to them.

MR. CRAMER: Thank you, your Honor.

(The following transpired in open court:)

THE COURT: The objection was made by defense counsel as to the statements made by the other defendant, Kiki Melendez, to this witness, which statements were made out of the presence of the defendant, Ortiz.

Normally that would be considered hearsay evidence. Except that the prosecutor has represented to the Court, in answer to the Court's inquiries of him, that the Government will establish a conspiracy, from the evidence, between Melendez and the defendant, Ortiz.

In the event that the Government fails to establish a conspiracy, then of course any testimony of a hearsay nature would be subject to a motion to dismiss, or to strike, rather, at which time the Court would so instruct the jury, and ask that they disregard any hearsay testimony -- and, more specifically, answers to specific

questions -- if the Government does not meet the burden in that respect.

So the Court cautions the jury to keep in mind that statements made outside the presence of the defendant, Ortiz, by others, are normally hearsay evidence, and normally not valid evidence.

But the Court is allowing it in this instance because the Covernment has represented that it will establish the conspiracy under Count 1. And it is being admitted under Count 1 only as to the defendant Ortiz.

You may proceed.

MR. CRAMER: Your Honor I would like to voice an objection to the wording of the cautionary instruction. I think the instruction should be that the Government must not only establish conspiracy in order for the jury to consider the hearsay --

MR. SMITH: I object to this argument, your Honor.

THE COURT: I think it has been made clear enough. In the event they don't establish the conspiracy you can move to quash the hearsay evidence, and the Court would normally grant your motion.


MR. CRAMER: The additional phrase I think 2 should be added: "Established by a fair 3 preponderance of the evidence." 4 THE COURT: I think the jury will understand 5 it clearly. MR. CRAMER: I think it can be explained 6 7 and elaborated a little more clearly. 8 THE COURT: The Court thinks it has been 9 elaborated on sufficiently. 10 Proceed. 11 BY MR. SMITH: Q Trooper Valentin, I believe you had a conversation 12 with Kiki Melendez on the afternoon of February 9, 1976; is 13 that correct? 14 15 A Yes. 16 Q Mr. Luis Lopez was present with you during that 17 conversation; is that correct? 18 A Yes. 19 Q What if anything was said to Kiki Melendez about 20 your purpose in being there? 21 A We told him we wanted to buy a quarter piece of 22 cocaine. 23 THE COURT: Say that again? It isn't clear 24 to me.

THE WITNESS: He asked me --

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THE COURT: State the name of who said what. because we are dealing with two or three people. THE WITNESS: Kiki Melendez asked us who was looking for Frankie --5 THE COURT: Who did he speak to, you or your friend? 6 THE WITNESS: He said it in general, your 7 8 Honor. 9 THE COURT: All right. THE WITNESS: And Luis Lopez answered "I am." 10 And he told us that -- Kiki told us that Frankie 11 was not around. 12 13 BY MR. SMITH: Q You said about a quarter of a piece. What did you 14 tell Frankie --15 16 A He asked me what we --17 Q Excuse me. What did you tell Kiki about a quarter 18 piece? 19 We wanted to buy a quarter piece of coke. A 20 Q Of coke? Coke is a nickname for what? 21 A Cocaine. 22 Q Would you tell the members of the jury what 23 exactly is a quarter piece? What does the term "piece" mean? 24 MR. CRAMER: Objection. It calls for expert 25 testimony.

cocaine? 20 bucks. 2 20? And it is a very small bag? Q 3 A Yes. 4 How many bags are there, if you know, in a quarter Q 5 piece? 6 Approximately 75 bags -- 75 to 100 bags. A 7 Now you told Kiki Melendez you wanted a quarter Q 8 piece of cocaine? 9 A Yes. 10 What if anything did Kiki Melendez say to you and 11 Luis Lopez on February 9th, 1976? MR. CRAMER: Objection, your Honor, for the 13 record. I want to make an objection to the whole 14 line of questioning, for the same reason stated 15 previously. 16 THE COURT: Same ruling. 17 BY MR. SMITH: 18 What did Kiki Melendez say to you and Mr. Lopez? 19 A That Frankie had sold a piece in the morning, and 20 had the rest under lock and key, and that he, Kiki, had only 21 bags. 22 We told him we wanted to buy bags, and we left. 23 Did he say anything about his willingness to deal 24



in bags?

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Now, what happened at the Span'sh Bar? A Well, we parked across the street from the bar on 2 3 Chestnut Street. 4 You and Mr. Lopez? 0 5 A Yes. And we engaged other people there, that we had known, in conversation. And a few minutes later we 6 observed Kiki across the street from us, and he walked toward 7 our car, and stood on the passenger side of the car. 8 9 I overheard him tell Mr. Lopez that if we wanted 10 to buy bags, to go to him, for him to go alone, not to take 11 me with him. Q You went to the Spanish Bar and saw Kiki Melendez 12 13 again? 14 Yes, sir. A And he came over to the car? 15 Q 16 Yes, sir. A 17 Q And you and Mr. Lopez were in the car? 18 Yes, sir. A And Kiki Melendez again said, in your presence, 19 that he would deal with Mr. Lopez? 20 A Yes, sir. 21 Did he say anything about you again? 22 2 He wouldn't deal to me. 23 A He said that? 24 Q

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Well, he inferred it when he said that for him to

come alone, and not to bring me. 2 Q Did Kiki Melendez state why he didn't want you to . 3 come along? A Well, he was afraid I might be "the man", a police 4 5 officer. Did he tell Mr. 'spez what to do if Mr. Lopez 6 7 wanted to buy dope? 8 Yes, sir, he did. A 9 Q What did he tell Mr. Lopez? 10 A To come by himself. To come back by himself? 11 Q 12 A By himself. Did you go back to 15 Cabot Street that night? 13 Q A No, we did not. 14 Q Why not? 15 It was late and we had been out on the street a 16 long time, and figured we'd call it a day. 17 Roughly what time was this that you had this 18 conversation with Mr. Melendez at the Spanish Ear? 19 It was late in the afternoon. 20 The conversation wasn't actually in the bar itself? 21 Q No, sir, it was outside. A 22 Did you ever have occasion to go back to 15 Cabot 23 Q Street? 24

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Yes, sir, we did.

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1	Q And when was that? When was the next time you went
2	back?
3	A The following day.
4	Q That is what date?
5	A February 10th.
6	Q Now, directing your attention to the afternoon of
7	February 10th, 1976, would you tell the members of the jury
8	what you and Mr. Lopez did that afternoon?
9	A I picked up Mr. Lopez at his home and we went to
10	a pre-arranged location, where we usually met. There the
11	search was made of Mr. Lopez. I obtained the money for
13	buys, to purchase narcotics, and we went to 15 Cabot Street.  THE COURT: So that we get that, you picked up Lopez at his home?
15	THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor.
16	THE COURT: You said you went to a place
17	where you usually met?
18	THE WITNESS: Yes, I meant the covering
19	officers and ourselves.
20	THE COURT: The what?
21	THE WITNESS: The covering officers, the
22	individuals that covered us while purchases were
23	made.
24	THE COURT: The covering officers?
25	THE WITNESS: Police officers.

\$180 and the time he came back out with these 15 bags, how 2 much time elapsed? 3 A No more than five minutes. Q Now, did you actually see or witness the sale of 4 5 these bags to Mr. Lopez? A I did not. 6 7 Q Did you see either Kiki Melendez or Jesus Ortiz 8 on that day? 9 A I did not. 10 Q By the way, do you know whether Mr. Ortiz has a 11 nickname? 12 Yes, sir. A 13 Q What is his nickname? 14 A Chombo. 15 Q Can you spell that? 16 C-h-o-m-b-o. A 17 Q What if anything does that mean in Spanish? 18 I haven't the slightest idea. MR. CRAMER: Objection to the relevancy of 19 20 that question. THE COURT: He answered that he doesn't know. 21 BY MR. SMITH: 22 Q And Mr. Lopez gave these 15 bags to you, and you 23 put them in your shirt pocket; is that correct? 24

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A Right.

1	LUIS PLACIDO LOPEZ, appearing
2	as a witness, being duly sworn, testified as follows:
. 3	THE CLERK: Would you state your full name?
4	THE WITNESS: Luis Placido Lopez.
5	THE CLERK: Your address?
6	THE WITNESS: 294 Colony Street, Meridan,
7	Connecticut.
8	DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SMITH:
9	Q Mr. Lopez, I'm going to ask you to speak slowly
10	and keep your voice up, if you possibly can, so the two
11	ladies down at the end of the jury box can hear you, and
12	we'll know everybody in the jury has heard you too, okay?
13	I will.
14	Q Would you state your full, complete name for the
15	record?
16	A Luis Placido Lopez Espinoza.
17	Company Espinoza?
18	A That's my mother's last name.
19	Q That's your mother's last name?
20	A Yes.
21	Q Is it common in the Spanish culture to take one's
22	mother's last name?
23	A Yes. In Puerto Rico you use both names, father and
24	mother's.
25	Q With a hyphen in between them?

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Yes.

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Q Were you convicted of possession of burglar tools in New York in 1966? Yes. And loitering with intent to steal -- whatever that is -- in 1970? A Yes. Were you convicted of the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle? A Yes. Q In New Jersey, in 1970? Yes. Were you also convicted in Federal Court of driving a stolen car across state lines? Yes. And did the State of New York also prosecute y for the theft of that car which was driven across state lines? A Yes. Now, this was in 1973, correct? Right. A Q Now, were you also convicted recently in Connecticut, back in December of 1975, of threatening, criminal trespass?

A Yes.

Q Now, as a result of your conviction in Federal

Court for driving this stolen car across state lines, were you

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sentenced to prison?

- A They sent me to prison, right.
- Q Which prison were you sentenced to?
- A Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.
- Q How long did you serve in Lewisburg?
- A 17 months.
- Q 17 months out of a two year sentence?
- A Right.
- Q Now, had you ever been convicted in your entire life of narcotics?
  - A Not in my life. I never use narcotics.
  - Q You never used narcotics in your life?
  - A Never.
- Q Do you have any particular feelings about narcotics?

MR. CRAMER: Objection, your Honor.

MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I would claim it. I think it is relevant.

MR. CRAMER: What do his feelings have to do with it?

THE COURT: I suppose, Counselor, it is like sin; everybody doesn't love sin -- I suppose they wouldn't love narcotics. I suppose that is the obvious answer.

It is harmless; he may answer. I don't know

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## worked with him?

- A About 25 different times.
- Q Can you give us, in terms of days, per week, how many days per week you would estimate you worked?
  - A Three or four times a week.
  - Q Since October?
  - A October.
- Q Now, is there any particular reason why, to your knowledge, you work with Rafael Valentin?
- A Well, he's Spanish, in the first place, and he's got a good reputation, and he's a good officer, and I like to work with him.
  - Q You like him?
  - A Yes.
- Q Now, does your undercover work with Rafael Valentin, has it resulted in any other cases than this case?
  - A Yes.
  - Q And who has prosecuted those cases?
    - A I believe you. You are the prosecutor.
    - Q Do you know a gentleman named "Frankie" Melendez?
- A Yes.
- Q And do you know a gentleman named "Kiki" Melendez?
- A Yes.
- Q What relationship is "Frankie" Melendez to "Kiki"
- 25 | Melendez?

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A They are brothers. 2 Q How long have you known Frankie Melendez? 3 A Well, I've been knowing him around 1969 -- '70. Now, do you also know the defendant, Jesus Ortiz? 4 Q 5 A Well, I used to see him in the street, hanging And I used to know him with a nickname of "Chombo". around. 6 7 Q About how long have you known Mr. Ortiz? 8 A 171-172. 9 Q '71 or '72? 10 A Yes. Do you know what relationship, if any, he is to 11 the Melendez brothers? 12 13 Before I know what kind of relationship there 14 was --I mean, do you know whether he is related to them? 15 Q That is what I am getting at. 16 17 Right now, yes, I know. 18 What is the relationship? Q A Brother-in-law, 19 Brother-in-law? Q 20 Right. A 21 So, do you know how it is that he happens to be the 22 brother-in-law of Kiki and Frankie Melendez? He married his 23 sister, for example? 24

The way I understand, he is married to

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for cocaine?

A To the two girls?

Q Yes.

A No, I asked them for Mr. Frankie Melende:.

Q And did you see Frankie Melendez on February 9,

1 19769

A No.

Did you see Kiki Melendez on that day?

A. Yes.

Q Tell the members of the jury just what happened, picking it up from the time you saw those girls.

A Mr. Kiki Melendez came out and say "Who asking for Frankie?"

I say "I am."

He say "What do you want?"

I say "I want to buy a quarter piece."

MR. CRAMER: Objection, your Honor. I am going to object to this whole testimony, on the same grounds before, as hearsay, not during the course of the conspiracy.

THE COURT: Same ruling.

MR. CRAMER: May the record reflect I am objecting to further questions on this particular line?

THE COURT: Well, I don't like to have general

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rulings outstanding. Your objection is to what Kiki Melendez said to this witness?

MR. CRAMER: On February 9th.

THE COURT: On February 9th?

MR. CRAMER: That's correct.

THE COURT: That's the standing objection, and the Court will make the same ruling.

BY MR. SMITH:

Q What did Kiki Melendez say to you?

A He said that he only got bags; that his brother, Frankie, was out; that day earlier he had sold a piece of dope and he was supposed to come back in an hour. There was some more dope that was locked, and he don't have the key.

- Q Frankie said that he had bags?
- A Right.
- Q You said that you were looking for a quarter piece?
- A Right.
- Q Who, if anyone, was with you when Frankie said this?
- A Ralph Valentin.
- Q Now, did Kiki say anything at all about his willingness to deal, to sell cocaine to you on that day?

A On that day he told me that he only had bags, and his brother had just sold a piece.

Q Did he say anything about his willingness to deal with Ralph Valentin?

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1		A	Well, at that time he don't mention that he doesn't
2	want	to s	ell Ralph Valentin.
3		Q	How long were you and Ralph Valentin with Kiki
4	Melen	dez a	at 15 Cabot Street on February 9, 1976?
5	ME!	A	How long? About say a minute, something like that.
6	260	Q.	A short period of time?
. 7		A	A short period of time.
8	6013	Q.III	What did you do, what if anything did you do after
9	you h	ad th	his conversation with Kiki Melendez on February 9th?
10		A	We then exit the building after the conversation.
11		Q	Did you go any particular place?
12	1,000	A	Yes, we went around Main Street, Albany Avenue,
13	and c	ome,	and then we stopped in front of the bar of
14	Chest	nut a	and Albany.
15		Q	Chestnut and Albany Avenue, Hartford, Connecticut?
16		A	Right, Hartford, Connecticut.
17		Q	What bar is that?
18		A	It is a bar right on the corner. I don't know the
19	name	of th	he bar.
20		Q	Spanish bar?
21		A	Spanish bar.
22		Q	That's what you call it?
23		A	Right.
24		Q	Now, did you see Kiki Melendez again that day?
25		A	Yes, we park in front of the bar, and standing on

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the corner was Kiki Melendez.

Q Did you and Trooper Valentin engage in any conversation with Kiki Melendez on February 9, 1976?

A He came over to the car. I was sitting on the passenger side.

Q Kiki?

A Yes, he came over to the passenger side and told me he got bags, if I want to buy some bags come over to 15 Cabot Street, but don't bring Ralph Valentin in, because he is scared that he was a cop. He don't trust Ralph Valentin.

Q He said this right in Valentin's presence?

A Yes, and he say it in a natural voice. So, Trooper Valentin overheard.

- Q Now, Trooper Valentin was sitting where?
- A In the driver's seat.
- Q And you were sitting on the passenger side?
- 18 A I was.
  - Q Kiki came over to the window?
  - A To the window, right.
    - Q And you rolled the window down?
  - A Yes.
  - Q Now, did you in fact go back to 15 Cabot Street that day, February 9th?
    - A No, we finished with that day.

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Q When was the next time you went back to 15 Cabot Street?

The next day, on the 10th.

Again, Mr. Lopez, taking it slowly, and with as much detail as you can remember, would you please tell the members of the jury what exactly happened on February 10, 1976?

A February 10, 1976 we came back to 15 Cabot Street.

Q You and Ralph Valentin?

A Me and Ralph Valentin. At that time Ralph Valentin stayed in his vehicle.

I went inside the building, second floor again, and there was a lady there.

I asked the lady for Mr. Frankie Melendez. While
I was talking to this lady a young boy, a man, came from the
third floor. He asked me what do I want?

I say "I want to purchase a quarter piece."

He said "Look, Kiki is sleeping."

Q "Sleeping"?

A Yes, sleeping, "and Frankie is not here."

When I get to the sidewalk I heard somebody calling "Hey you, come back."

So I say okay. I started to exit the building.

I look up. The same kid who told me that Kiki was sleeping was at the window, hollering at me.

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I went back. When I get to the second floor there was Mr. Kiki Melendez in there, with the kid.

He asked me what do I want? I say "Well, I want to purchase a quarter piece."

He said "I got bags, and I got 15 bags; I give it to you for \$12 apiece, or for \$180, if you want it."

I said "Good, let me go and get the money."

Valentin's car, and I told him the story. Trooper Valentin then gave me \$180, and I went back in the building. When I got to the second floor Mr. Kiki Melendez and the other man was in there. Kiki Melendez take me up to the top floor, and Mr. Chombo was with the door open, waiting.

- Q You say Mr. Chombo?
- A That gentleman right in there (indicating).
- Q And you recognize the gentleman sitting over at defense counsel table, that individual?

A Yes, it was the man who was standing at the door when I came in. He invited me back inside the apartment.

Q Invited you inside his apartment?

A Yes. I went inside the living room, and right behind me Mr. Kiki came in. He hollered to a woman who was in the front room.

- Q Who hollered?
- A Mr. Chombo.

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Okay. In Spanish -- he holler, he say "Bring me the dope." 3 A lady came from the front room, live him an 4 aspirin box. 5 Q A little aspirin box? 6 7 Yes. He open it. He count 15 bags, 15 foil bags. 8 He handed it to Mr. Kiki Melendez, who was standing next to him. 10 Q Wait a minute. A woman handed Chombo --11 A Right. Q -- a little aspirin, tin box? 12 13 A Right. 14 Q Chombo opened up the aspirin tin, and counted out 15 bags? 15 16 A Right, and count 15 bags. What did Chombo do with these 15 bags? 17 Q 18 A He give it to Mr. Kiki Melendez. 19 Q Okay. 20 A

Who was standing next to him. He told him "Count them."

Mr. Kiki Melendez count the 15 bags, gave it to me. And I gave Mr. Kiki Melendez \$180. He give it to Mr. Chombo. And that was --

Q You gave Kiki Melendez \$180 for the 15 bags?

1	A	Right.	
2	Q	And what did Mr. Melendez do with the \$180?	
3	A	Give it to Mr. Chombo, in front of me.	
4	Q	You say that when Mr. Ortiz opened up this aspirin	
5	tin and t	ook out the 15 foil packets he counted them?	
6	A	He counted them, and I was looking at him straight,	
7	making th	ne same count he was doing.	
8	Q	And then he handed them to Chombo handed the	
9	bags to F	Ciki?	
10	A	Kiki.	
11	Q	Kiki counted them again?	
12	A	Counted them again, and gave them to me.	
13	Q	Now, when you handed the money to Kiki, did he	
14	count the	e money?	
15	A	He passed it to Mr. Chombo, and Mr. Chombo started	
16	counting	it.	
17	Q	You say Mr. Chombo; you mean the defendant here?	
18	A	The gentleman right here.	
19	Q	Now, let me see if I got the straight in my mind	
20	and correct me if I'm wrong.		
21		You got to 15 Cabot Street?	
22	A	Right.	
23	Q	Trooper Valentin stayed in the car?	
24	A	Right.	
25	Q	You went in?	

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A Excuse me? Did they tell you in advance that they were going 3 to speak to the prosecutor about this arrest? 4 I told them to do me a favor and come down and 5 talk to the prosecutor about it. And see if they could get them di missed? That's 6 what you asked the agents to do, right? 7 8 Yes. 9 And that's what they did? They got a suspended 10 sentence for you? 11 A Yes. 12 So you now know if you get arrested again they will step in and get you a suspended sentence; isn't that true? 14 No, because if I commit a crime I'll be sent to A 15 jail. 16 Q You weren't sent to jail in December of 1975, were 17 you? 18 That 'doesn't mean I commit a crime I wasn't going to go to jail. 19 20 But you expect them to help you out if you do 21 commit a crime? 22 I'm not going to commit a crime.

Q :: If it ever happened you expect them to help you out? A If they want to help me. It is up to them. I'm not going to help me out. Whatever they want to do, it is up

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to them.

Q Did you ask them to help you out in December when they spoke to the prosecutor?

- A I asked them, right.
- Q And they immediately did it?
- A They went down.
- Q And because of their help you didn't go to jail?

A Probably because of that. Because the Judge doesn't have to take -- the District Attorney or the Judge doesn't have to take anything from them if they want to send me to jail.

Q The prosecutor nolled the criminal trespass?

A He knows, because the arresting officer had the papers in there.

Q But the prosecutor was the one who nolled the criminal trespass?

A Yes.

Q And he is the one who spoke to the agents; isn't that correct?

A Yes.

Q Which agents spoke to the prosecutor, do you know?

A Mr. Tozzi, or Mr. Valentin. I believe it was

Mr. Tozzi.

Q After they did this, did they make any statement to you -- they being Mr. Valentin or Mr. Tozzi, or any of

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those agents -- that you better help them out now because they helped you out? 2 They don't ask me for nothing. I do this 3 voluntarily. I do this for the last four years. 4 By voluntarily you mean you get paid? 5 Even if I don't get paid I do it, because I hate --A 6 I don't like drugs. 7 But you got paid how much money? You got paid from 8 the D.E.A. since you started working for them? 9 About \$2600, something like that. A. 10 That's from --Q 11 The D.E.A. only. The rest was from the State. A 12 From the State? How wich did they pay you? Q 13 About \$900. \$800 or nine hundred, something like 14 that. 15 You got a total of about \$3500? Q 16 Yes. A 17 Is any more money owed to you? 18 Q No. 19 A Q That was over how long a period? 20 Since October. 21 You didn't start getting paid from the D.E.A. 22 until December, right? 23 A I don't remember 24

, ,		
1	A	Yes. 136
2	Q	And you got paid January 23rd, \$60?
3	A	Yes.
4	Q	And you got paid again January 23rd, \$50?
5	A	Yes.
6	Q	So you don't get paid it is a regular interval?
7	A	I don't get paid by the week, like I said before.
8	I get pa	id according to the information that I supply.
9	Q	If you give them good information you get wore
10	money?	
11	A	If I give them good information I could, and they
12	pay me.	Otherwise I don't get nothing.
13	Q	By good information, the names of people who you
14	claim so	ld you drugs?
15	A	Not only the names, because when I work I don't
16	only bri	ng names, I also try to make the evidence.
17	Q	Try to make the evidence?
18	A	Yes, I do my best to get the evidence, too.
19	Q	If you give them some names and some evidence you
20	get more	money?
21	A give me.	Well, they decide the money, what they going to
23		But you know that the more names and more evidence
24	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	the more money you make, right?
25	Jou get,	If there are different cases, yes.
-		AA VIIVAV MAN NAN VANIA VIIVAV VIIVAN 1 1 0 0

Q For example, if a month went by and you didn't give them any names or any evidence, you don't get paid?

A Don't get paid.

Q If the next month you gave them the names of two people who sold you drugs, and some evidence, you get paid some money?

A Right.

Q And the following month if you gave them the names of six people, and evidence of six people, you get even more money?

A I get more money.

Q Right?

A But not for the six people.

Q You get more money because you have given higher quantity and quality information?

A Yes.

Q So you sort of have an incentive to go out and work, like the free enterprise system: the more you give, the more money you get; is that right?

A Yes.

Now, between February 11th and February 27th -you see that on the list?

A February 11th and February what?

Q 27th, of 1976.

A Yes.

Q And in those two dates, on those two dates
combined, you received \$270?
A Yes.
Q \$170 on February 11th, and \$100 on February 27th?
A Yes.
Q As a matter of fact, \$170 that you got, that was
one of the highest payments you received, isn't it?
A If it is there, it is right.
Q That was a big pay day for you?
A If it is there, I say it is right.
MR. CRAMER: I would like to mark this for
identification and submit it in evidence.
THE COURT: Exhibit B for identification.
MR. SMITH: May I have some voir dire?
BY MR. SMITH:
Q Did you prepare this document, Mr. Lopez?
A Me?
Q Yes.
A I never write nothing. I never know how much
Q Did you prepare this document?
Q Did you prepare this document?  A No, sir.
(VA) and share the second of t
A No, sir.
A No, sir.  Q Do you know what all these numbers and everything

1	Q And with Frankie Melendez?
2	A Yes.
3	Q And Pedro Melendez?
4	A I know the whole family.
5	Q You are family friends?
6	A Yes.
7	MR. SMITH: I have nothing further, your Honor
8	MR. CRAMER: Nothing further, your Honor.
. 9	THE COURT: Thank you.
10	(Witness excused.)
.11	THE COURT: Any other witnesses?
12	MR. CRAMER: I have no other witnesses, your
13	Honor.
14	THE COURT: Does the Government have any
15	witnesses?
16	MR. SMITH: It does, your Honor.
17	Again, if Mr. Cramer and I could approach
18	the Bench for about five seconds?
19	(The following transpired at the Bench:)
20	MR. CRAMER: As I did state previously in
21	chambers, I want to renew on the record, I want to
22	call Jesus Ortiz as a witness, without the use of
23	his 1970 record to impeach him. I want to renew
24	that, and I would like a ruling in advance.
25	THE COURT: You may call him as a witness, but

the record may be used against him.

MR. CRAMER: In that case I have no other witnesses to call.

MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I have one rebuttal witness that I have subpoensed, and that is Mr. William Jeffcoat of the Connecticut State Welfare Department, who has Mrs. Melendez' welfare application.

Now, the problem is I subpoenaed that, and he won't let me see what is in that application.

But I have reason to believe -- I know they are on welfare. And I know it is a violation of the Connecticut State Welfare Regulations for a woman to be living with the father of the children, and be receiving welfare.

And I know that one must make a signed, sworn statement to that effect urder oath.

THE COURT: To what effect?

MR. SMITH: To the effect that you were not living with your husband. We have the testimony of Mrs. Melendez that she has been living continuously with her husband, and that the husband is the father of the children. And I would like to introduce that document for impeachment purposes.

The first thing I would like to do, your Honor,

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#### JULY 28, 1976:

(In the absence of the jury:)

THE COURT: Does the Government have any requests to charge?

MR. SMITH: No, your Honor, it does not.

THE COURT: Has counsel seen the requests to charge of the defendant?

MR. SMITH: I have.

THE COURT: The Court advises both counsel, that except for Paragraph 8, in substance, although not in exact words, in substance the Court is going to cover the requests in general. But not Paragraph 8.

MR. CRAMER: May I be heard on a motion?

THE COURT: Certainly.

MR. CRAMER: I have two motions.

One motion is to strike all the testimony, the hearsay testimony -- well, two parts: One, to strike the hearsay testimony on February th. That is the statement of Kiki Melendez. The second part also is to strike all the hearsay testimony of Kiki Melendez on February 10th.

I think your Honor will recall testimony as to Kiki's out of court statements which were made, by Mr. Lopez yesterday, and there was an assertion

by the Assistant United States Attorney that that would be independent evidence of a conspiracy, which would then justify the use of the hearsay statement.

Well, for the sake of argument, we will assume that there was independent evidence of a conspiracy. But, I don't think there was any evidence at all that there was a conspiracy existing on February 9th, or any evidence from which that can be inferred.

There was no conspiracy until Mr. Lopez goes up to the third floor on February 10th.

I think that absolutely the test mony of a hearsay nature on February 9th should be stricken and excluded.

And the same thing with February 10th, before the time when they go up to the second floor -- the third floor, I'm sorry.

I think that all precedes the conspiracy -if in fact a conspiracy was established.

So, if it wasn't made during the course of the conspiracy it is just pure everyday hearsay, and not the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.

THE COURT: The motion is denied.

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that two copies of the Appellant's Brief and Appendix were mailed to Thomas P. Smith, Esq., Assistant United States Attorney, 450 Main Street, Hartford, Connecticut 06103, this 29th day of November, 1976.

Richard S. Cramer

Assistant Federal Public Defender